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Honest reporting is essential for society to function well. However,
people frequently lie when asked to provide information, such as
misrepresenting their income to save money on taxes. A landmark
finding published in PNAS [L. L. Shu, N. Mazar, F. Gino, D. Ariely,
M. H. Bazerman, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109, 15197–15200
(2012)] provided evidence for a simple way of encouraging honest
reporting: asking people to sign a veracity statement at the begin-
ning instead of at the end of a self-report form. Since this finding was
published, various government agencies have adopted this practice.
However, in this project, we failed to replicate this result. Across five
conceptual replications (n = 4,559) and one highly powered, preregis-
tered, direct replication (n = 1,235) conducted with the authors of the
original paper, we observed no effect of signing first on honest report-
ing. Given the policy applications of this result, it is important to up-
date the scientific record regarding the veracity of these results.
nudge | policy-making | morality | replication
Five of the seven authors of this manuscript conducted re-search published in PNAS (1), showing that signing a veracity
statement at the beginning of a tax form (in two small-sample
laboratory studies) as well as an insurance audit form (in a field
experiment), as opposed to the standard procedure of signing it
at the end of the form, decreases dishonest reporting of personal
information. The original paper also found that signing first reduces
dishonesty by making ethics more salient, although this effect was
demonstrated only in one small-sample laboratory experiment.
Three of the authors (Kristal, Whillans, and Bazerman) attempted to
extend what we thought was the critical finding from that PNAS
paper: simply signing a veracity statement at the beginning instead of
at the end of a task in which individuals can cheat and report a higher
performance to earn more money reduces dishonest reporting. In
particular, Kristal, Whillans, and Bazerman initiated a new project
on inducing honesty online by signing first versus last. However,
despite repeated attempts, Kristal, Whillans, and Bazerman did not
find that signing a veracity statement at the beginning of a task re-
duced dishonesty in comparison to signing at the end. As a conse-
quence of these null effects, together with the original authors of the
PNAS paper, the authors then set out to conduct a direct replication
of the first laboratory experiment described in the PNAS paper (1).
There are several reasons why Kristal, Whillans, and Bazerman
continued to pursue this line of research and why we eventually
conducted a direct replication. The original finding has been cited
345 times in peer-reviewed publications, and governments around
the world have spent time and effort operationalizing this finding
in various policy domains. We are also aware of two published
failures of signing first to increase tax collection. The most rele-
vant is an experiment that was conducted in a local authority in
the United Kingdom (2). In this experiment, the intervention di-
rectly tested the veracity statement and signature requirement at
the top versus at the bottom with no significant differences. A
second relevant experiment was conducted in Guatemala (3), but
in this case the test compared adding an additional signature
prompt before filling out a tax form compared with no additional
prompt. The additional signature prompt was part of a CAPTCHA
pop-up box window and not of the tax form itself (but there was a
signature box at the end of the form in both conditions). There is
one reported success in the United States (at increasing median
amount of sales declared by goods and services vendors to the
government, with no further statistical information provided).
Yet, this intervention did not directly test the sign first versus last
mechanism and instead added a signature prompt at the begin-
ning of a form compared with the standard procedure of having
no signature prompt (4). However, field experiments are often
conducted in noisy environments, allowing many alternative ex-
planations that could account for potentially mixed results. Thus,
tightly controlled laboratory experiments are needed to confirm
the conclusion of these studies.
The hypothesis that was tested in the original PNAS paper was
that signing a veracity statement at the beginning (vs. the standard
procedure of signing at the end) of a self-report form like a tax or an
insurance audit form would reduce dishonest reporting by making
ethics more salient before someone had the opportunity to cheat.
To test this hypothesis in the original PNAS paper (1), there were
two laboratory experiments (n = 101 and n = 60, respectively) and
one field experiment (n = 13,488). Across the two laboratory ex-
periments, participants were asked to self-report on a tax form their
income from a previously completed task and their travel expenses
incurred to participate in the study, and they were paid according to
their self-reports. In experiment 1, one-third of the participants
were asked to sign a veracity statement “I declare that I carefully
examined this return and that to the best of my knowledge and
belief it is correct and complete” that was placed at the beginning of
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the tax form before reporting the two amounts, while another third
saw the veracity statement at the end of the tax form after reporting
the two amounts, and the final third did not see a veracity statement
(control). In experiment 2 we only had the two conditions—before
versus after reporting. Unbeknownst to participants, the authors
knew exactly how much of the task participants accurately com-
pleted, allowing authors to assess cheating—as measured by the
percentage of people who cheated through overreporting their in-
come, as well the specific amounts they overclaimed. Consistent
with the stated hypothesis, in these two laboratory studies (1),
fewer participants cheated (2), they claimed more accurate
performances, and (3) claimed fewer expenses (likely due to
more honest reporting of their expenses) when the veracity
statement that they were asked to sign was placed at the top of
the tax form (vs. at the bottom).
The original PNAS paper also replicated these findings in a real-
world insurance setting, where customers were purportedly randomly
assigned to report the odometer reading of their cars on an audit
form sent by their automobile insurance company, and they en-
countered and were asked to sign a veracity statement either at the
bottom (standard practice) or at the top of filling out the form. Based
on the odometer reading reported on the previous audit form we
then calculated customers’ reported use of their car (i.e., number of
miles driven). However, the reported odometer readings in the two
conditions were significantly different at baseline.
One possible interpretation of the baseline difference in reported
miles driven is that the randomization failed (or may have even
failed to occur as instructed) in that study. The significant findings in
terms of difference in reported miles holds when controlling for
miles driven at baseline. See Table 1 for summary statistics from the
original field experiment. The original field data are now available at
https://osf.io/3javq/ along with the rest of the materials for this paper.
As Kristal, Whillans, and Bazerman launched their investigation
of inducing honesty online, they conducted a series of laboratory
experiments in which they asked participants to sign a veracity
statement before (vs. after) reporting their performance on a task
where the pay was tied to their performance (“sign-first”). Across
their first four studies, they failed to obtain a significant result,
either in an online or an offline context.
As they obtained repeated failures to find a significant sign-
first effect in both online and offline contexts, they shifted the
focus of their project to replicate the original result and asked all
original authors to join the project for study 6.
Studies 1–5 were conducted as part of a larger project exam-
ining whether people were more likely to cheat in an online (vs.
offline environment).*
In study 1, participants were told to roll dice and report the total
of their roll in exchange for lottery tickets. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to a sign-first condition (before reporting), a sign-last
condition, or a control condition where participants were not asked
to provide signatures (see Materials and Methods for more details).
Given the design of the experiment, it was not possible to tell what
participants’ individual true performances were, but the average
number reported could be compared both to the expected distri-
bution under fair conditions and to each of the conditions.
In studies 2–5, participants were asked to complete a series of
tasks that allowed us to examine individual-level cheating. In these
four studies, participants were randomly assigned to complete a
veracity statement that was placed before or after reporting how
much of the task they completed. All tasks included unsolvable
items. Cheating was defined as people reporting having completed
more “solved” items than the possible maximum solvable (i.e.,
participants’ true performance was somewhat accessible).
Studies 1–5 were intended to study whether online cheating could
be reduced by asking people to provide an online signature before
versus after reporting, rather than the goal of providing a replication,
and as a result, these studies did not include the identical
methods that were originally used in the PNAS paper (1). One
possibility is that differences in methods could have potentially
accounted for the null results that Kristal, Whillans, and Bazerman
observed in studies 1–5; specifically, while all studies were incentive-
compatible, these new studies used forms where there was not
necessarily an established norm for providing a signature at the
bottom and no cost for dishonesty, whereas the Shu et al. (1)
experiments included tax and audit forms where people typically
expect to provide their signature at the end and would risk punish-
ment for dishonesty. Thus, in study 6, we conducted a direct repli-
cation of study 1 of the PNAS (1) manuscript (leaving out the pure
control condition: no signature), given that it was the most tightly
controlled laboratory experiment and it produced the largest
effect size for percent of people overclaiming their performance
income (d = 0.70) (1). We conducted this study using current
best practices for ensuring replicable research (5): we conducted
adequate power calculations before undertaking the direct rep-
lication, we preregistered our analyses, and we made all of our
materials publicly available.
Results
In Table 2, we report the sample sizes, tasks, populations, and
confidence intervals of the studies in the original paper and the
current paper. Whereas in the original PNAS paper there were
about 30 participants per condition in the laboratory studies, the
new experiments have a minimum of 70 participants per condi-
tion, thus providing much more highly powered tests.
Whereas the original PNAS findings show that having the
veracity statement that people are asked to sign at the beginning
promotes honesty (1), in the new study 1, there was no difference
in the average performance reporting across conditions. After
rolling a 12-sided die twice, there was no significant difference
between the average when it was reported when individuals were
asked to sign first (M = 14.76) and when they were not asked to
sign first† (M = 14.48) (t[272] = −0.49, P = 0.62).
All conditions displayed cheating, considering the averages
significantly differed from the expected average of the distribution
Table 1. Summary statistics from study 3 from Shu et al. (1)
Sign-at-the-bottom,
means (SD)
Sign-at-the-top,
means (SD) Two-sided t test, values
Baseline odometer reading (t0) 75,034.50 (50,265.35) 59,692.71 (49,953.51) t(13,474) = 17.78, P < 0.0001
New odometer reading (t1) 98,705.14 (51,934.76) 85,791.10 (51,701.31) t(13,475) = 14.47, P < 0.0001
Difference in odometer
readings; i.e., miles driven (t1–t0)*
23,670.64 (12,621.38) 26,098.40 (12,253.37) t(13,448) = −11.331, P < 0.0001
*This row was the outcome reported in the original paper.
*The key results of these studies hold controlling for whether people signed a veracity
statement in an online versus an offline environment.
†Given the lack of statistical significance between signing after and no signature in both
Shu et al. (1) and in this study, we collapse across those two conditions to test signing first
versus not signing first.
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(M = 13) (P < 0.001).‡ In other words, all groups had similar rates
of relatively low cheating regardless of condition.
A limitation of this first new study is that there was no way to tell
which individuals cheated. Therefore, studies 2–5 (n = 4,115) were
designed to be able to detect cheating on the individual level. In
those four new studies, people who were asked to sign the veracity
statement before reporting were no more likely to cheat than people
who were asked to sign the veracity statement after reporting (for
percent of cheating P = [0.81, 0.82, 0.78, 0.91] or amount of cheating
P = [0.76, 0.58, 0.52, 0.91]). Bayes t tests were run to obtain a Bayes
factor (the default prior of an alternative effect size of r = 0.707 was
used, which is consistent with the original paper).§ The Bayes factors
ranged from 6.25 to 20.00. Thus, each study provides substantial to
strong evidence in support of the null hypothesis (6).
In the direct replication study 6, we preregistered our methods
and analytic plan (5) and had the power to detect an effect size
of d = 0.10 at 80% power. We failed to detect an effect of signing
first on all three preregistered outcomes (percent of people
cheating per condition, t[1,232.8] = −1.50, P = 0.8942, d = −0.07
95% confidence interval [CI] [−1.96, 0.976]; amount of cheating
per condition, t[1,229.3] = −0.717, P = 0.7633, d = −0.04 95%
CI[−1.96, 0.976]; and amount of expenses reported, t[1,208.9] =
−1.099, P = 0.864, d = −0.06 95% CI[−1.96, 0.976]). The Bayes
factors for these three outcome measures were between 7.7 and
12.5, revealing substantial support for the null hypothesis (6).
This laboratory experiment provides the strongest evidence to
date that signing first does not encourage honest reporting.
Further suggestive evidence in favor of the null (of a negligible
effect size) is the fact that Bayesian analysis reveals that 88% of the
posterior density falls within the conventional region of practical
equivalent (ROPE) of Cohen’s d of [−0.1, 0.1]. For this analysis, we
set a very weakly informative prior (normal distribution with
mean = 0 and SD = 10) (7). Drawing on previously published
methodology and code (8, 9), we analyzed studies 1–5 sequentially
and then used the final prior as the basis for analysis of study 6. We
found the highest density interval (HDI) interval of the standard
effect size estimate (for the percent of people cheating per condi-
tion) to be [−0.07, 0.14], and 88% of the posterior distribution falls
within the ROPE. While not conclusively equivalent to zero, this
provides further suggestive evidence for a negligible or nonexistent
effect (for a discussion of decision rules using HDI + ROPE, see
ref. 10).
Fig. 1 shows a forest plot, depicting the effect sizes across the
six replications, along with the metaanalytic effect size for
amount reported and confidence intervals. Negative effect sizes
indicate a reduction in cheating.
Discussion
In the original PNAS paper, across two laboratory experiments
(n = 161), the authors found that asking participants to sign a
veracity statement placed at the top of a tax form increased
honest responding as compared to at the end of the tax form
(1). After conducting six studies that were larger and more
highly powered (n = 5,794), including one direct replication of
one of the two original PNAS laboratory studies, we did not
replicate a sign-first effect.
Our studies contained a mix of online and laboratory experi-
ments, and we used three different paradigms (anagram task, a
Table 2. Effect sizes of the experiments in the current and original investigation demonstrating the effect of having people sign a
veracity statement attesting to their honest reporting placed before versus after reporting
Study
Sample
size
Number of
conditions Cheating task Population
Average performance
reported effect size
(d) [95% CI]*
This study
Study 1 444 6 Die rolling Community laboratory 0.11 [−0.09, 0.30]
Study 2 408 4 Anagrams Community laboratory −0.01 [−0.20, 0.18]
Study 3 442 2 Anagrams MTurk 0.05 [−0.14, 0.24]
Study 4 743 3 Anagrams MTurk −0.05 [−0.19, 0.10]
Study 5 2,522 2 Anagrams Naive MTurk 0.01 [−0.07, 0.09]
Study 6 (direct
replication of
PNAS study 1)
1,235 2 Paper matrix; self-reported
travel expenses
Community laboratory −0.04 [−0.07, 0.15]†
Shu et al. (1) study
Study 1 101 3 Paper matrix; self-reported travel expenses Students −1.05 [−1.55, −0.53]†
Study 2 60 2 Paper matrix; self-reported travel expenses Students −0.53 [−1.04, −0.01]†
Study 3 13,488 2 Odometer reading reported on audit form Automobile insurance clients −0.20 [−0.16, −0.23]
*For all tasks, effect sizes are reported for the differences in total amounts reported between conditions. Negative effect size indicates reduction in cheating.
†Effect sizes reported in the last column are based on the paper matrix performance only, not the claimed travel expenses.
Fig. 1. New studies: The effect of signing first on self-reported performance.
Zero (illustrated with the dotted line) indicates no mean difference, the point
corresponds to the point estimate for the effect size (Cohen’s d) for each
individual study, and the error bars represent the 95% confidence interval
around the effect size.
‡We tested this by running simulations in R and comparing our observed data distribution
to that of 1,000,000 simulated die rolls.
§A Bayes t test provides a Bayes factor which assesses the strength of the evidence in favor
of one hypothesis (the null) over the alternative.
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die-rolling task, and a matrix task with all solvable matrices but
strict time pressure). Our participants ranged from experienced
Amazon MechanicalTurk (MTurk) workers to naive MTurk
workers to university students to Boston and Chicago community
members.** See Table 3 for a list of moderators we tested.
There are a number of explanations for why the original PNAS
authors may have obtained positive results from the two labo-
ratory experiments. It could have been type I error due to small
sample sizes or some other problem in running the experiments.
Another possibility is the fact that the study might have been
conducted with insufficient supervision. Although the original
authors had always trusted the data, given the new highly powered
data, the original authors now question those original results.
The original authors have a third laboratory experiment, which
was not included in the originally published PNAS paper, where
signing first significantly reduced dishonesty; however, this was
compared with no honesty statement or signature. While we have
two examples (one from Shu et al. (1) and one from this paper
[study 1]) failing to find a difference between signing at the bottom
or no signature, we do not have enough evidence to make claims in
the current paper about the effect of signing versus not signing at
all. Therefore, we would like to emphasize that the focus of this
paper is the effect of signing an honesty declaration at the top of
a form compared to the bottom and not to make a claim regarding
the effectiveness of priming honesty in general, be it through honor
codes, oaths, or honesty statements.
In addition, in terms of the field experiment from the original
PNAS paper, with the failure to directly replicate the results of the
original laboratory experiment 1, we now look at the field study
with new eyes and are concerned with its potential flaws, including
the significantly different odometer readings at baseline. At base-
line (before the study was conducted), individuals in the control
group, on average, had driven 75,034.50 miles (SD = 50,265.35),
while individuals in the treatment group had driven, on average,
59,692.71 miles (SD = 49,953.51), t(13,474) = 17.78, P < 0.0001.
Before writing up this report, we searched the current literature
(specifically, the papers citing the original finding), and a subset of
the authors put out a call for academic papers in order to conduct a
metaanalysis; however, we were unable to find any papers that
looked explicitly at the effect of signing at the top of a form compared
with signing at the bottom in the context of honesty (for example,
we found papers using signing first as the control, papers about
oaths more generally, or signing in a consumer behavior con-
text). We also received no papers from other scholars that could
help us in this attempt. For more information about our criteria
for inclusion, the places we circulated this call for papers, and the
papers we received, see SI Appendix. In this paper we tested
numerous conceptually relevant moderators, and none of them
influenced the effect. Therefore, we can conclude from these
data that there is no good evidence for the existence of this ef-
fect, and the limited times it has been documented in the liter-
ature are likely a type 1 error.
We would like to emphasize that the focus of this paper is the
replicability of the previously reported effect of signing an honesty
declaration at the top of a form compared to the bottom. Conse-
quently, instead of continuing to explore whether or when signing
at the top versus the bottom reduces dishonesty, future research
could focus on the underlying principles. For example, future re-
search could examine whether other approaches to moral salience—
such as stronger invocations of one’s identity—could reduce
dishonesty, in light of our newest evidence that simply moving
the signature box from the bottom to the top of a form is an in-
sufficient intervention. What remains to be resolved is the necessary
and sufficient conditions, if any, for the relevant manipulation to
link subsequent behavior to conceptions of the self as honest and
thus alter such behavior. This may depend on contextual factors not
explored in the present research undertaking.
Small changes to the decision-making environment (“nudges”)
have been shown to increase organ donation (12), retirement sav-
ings (13), and tax collection (14). The IRS estimates that over $387
billion are underreported annually, with over 68% of that money
owed by individual taxpayers (15). Moving the veracity statement
that people are asked to sign at the bottom to the front of the tax
form has been touted as a “quick win.” However, even these
seemingly simple changes can incur significant implementation
costs. When one of the authors (Whillans) worked with a local
government, they spent $15,000 of labor costs and 6 mo trying to
implement this seemingly simple change.†† With the new data pre-
sented here, we recommend that practitioners take this finding out
of their intervention “tool-kit” as it is unlikely to increase honesty.
Materials and Methods
We obtained informed consent from all participants. We received ethical
approval from the Institutional Review Boards of Harvard University (IRB18-1518),
Table 3. Potential moderators we explored (and failed to detect) that we hypothesized could moderate the effect of having people
sign a veracity statement attesting to their honest reporting placed before versus after reporting
Potential moderator Relevant studies
Reporting online via typing vs.
reporting on paper via handwriting
Electronic reporting vs. handwriting reporting (studies 1 and 2)
Study population Laboratory population (Boston, studies 1,2, and 6; and Chicago, study 6; both community and student
populations in Boston and Chicago) vs. MTurk (studies 3–5)
Verbal vs. written instructions Study instructions written on computer screen/paper and participants read on their own (studies 1 and
studies 3–5) vs. research assistant provided instructions out loud (studies 2 and 6)
Task type Die rolling (study 1), anagram/word scramble (studies 2–5), matrix task (study 6), and expense reporting
(study 6)
Incentive/amount of additional
money at stake ($50 and under)
Raffle for $50 (study 1), up to $10 (study 2), $0.10 per reported answer (study 3 and 4), $0.30 per reported
answer (5), and up to $42 for reported answer and reported expenses
Amount of baseline cheating Study 3 (lowest cheating rate, 23% in the control group) to study 6 (highest cheating rate, 56% in the
control group)
Type of reporting form Regular participation form where generally there is no expectation of an honesty prompt (studies 1–5) vs.
official-looking tax form where in naturalistic context there is a general expectation of an honesty
prompt (study 6)
**Because previous research has shown differences between different types of signatures
(11), we used handwritten on paper, online typed, and online trackpad signatures.
None of these features affected our key results: being asked to sign at the top of a
form did not reduce dishonesty.
††This effort was before the replications were conducted and failed for other
administrative reasons.
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Boston University (#5010E), and the University of Chicago (IRB18-1420). For de-
mographic characteristics of participants, see SI Appendix, Table S1. See https://
osf.io/3javq/ for materials, implementation protocol, and all data and code.
Study 1. A sample of 444 adults was recruited from Harvard Business School’s
Computer Lab for Experimental Research community pool to participate in
the study in exchange for $2 and a chance of winning one of eight $50 prizes.
Participants rolled a 12-sided die twice and wrote down the sum of the two
rolls. The total reported corresponded to the number of entries into the raffle
to win one of the eight prizes. Participants were randomly assigned to sign a
veracity statement at the top of the form, before reporting; to sign at the
bottom of the form, after reporting; or they did not sign an honesty declaration.
Participants reported both online and on paper. See SI Appendix, Tables S2–S4,
for more details.
Study 2. A sample of 408 adults from Harvard’s Decision Science Laboratory
were recruited to participate in a study to earn up to $10. Participants were
given a list of 10 scrambled words. They were given 3 min to unscramble as
many words as they could. Participants were told they would be paid $1 for
each word they reported unscrambling. Participants were asked to sign (or
type) a veracity statement at the top of the form, before reporting, or at the
bottom of the form, after reporting. Participants reported both online and
on paper. See SI Appendix, Tables S5–S7, for more details.
Study 3. An online panel of 442 adults was recruited from Amazon
MechanicalTurk (MTurk) to participate in a study in exchange for $0.50 and a
potential bonus of up to $0.50. Participants completed the same task as
described in study 3 on an electronic device, but were given 5 words to
unscramble instead of 10, with a $0.10 bonus per answer. Participants were
asked to sign a veracity statement electronically using their trackpad before
or after reporting.
Study 4. An online panel of 903 adults was recruited from MTurk to partic-
ipate in a study in exchange for $0.50 and a potential bonus of up to $3.50.
Participants completed the same task as described in study 4, but were given
seven words to unscramble instead of five, with a $0.50 bonus per answer
reported. Participants signed a veracity statement using their trackpad before
or after reporting. The first two conditions had 743 participants. A third
condition was added, where participants had to report by submitting a video
of themselves saying their name and how many they solved.
Study 5.Anonline panel of 2,522 adults was recruited fromMTurk to participate
in a study in exchange for $0.50 and a potential bonus of up to $2.10. Partic-
ipation was limited to naive MTurk participants, who completed fewer than 100
human intelligence tasks. This allowed us to rule out the possibility that participants
may have heard of the intervention. Participants completed the same task as
described in study 5, but were given $0.30 bonus per answer reported. Partici-
pants signed a veracity statement using their trackpad before or after reporting.
Study 6. A sample of 1,235 adults was recruited across four laboratory sites
(Harvard’s Decision Science Laboratory pool, Boston University Questrom
School of Business community pool, and the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business Center for Decision Research campus and downtown
laboratories) to participate in a direct replication of study 1 from Shu et al.
(4) excluding the pure control condition. Participants completed a matrix
task and then filled out a tax form where they reported the income from the
matrices task, as well as their commuting expenses. Participants were paid a
$2 show-up fee and had the potential to earn up to an additional $40
depending on reported number of matrices solved and commuting ex-
penses. The results reported above hold controlling for testing location. See
SI Appendix, Table S8 for more details.
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